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The Judicial Public Policy Doctrine in Tax Litigation 
For over fifty years, courts have employed the public policy doc-
trine to disallow otherwise-permissible deductions from gross income 
in cases where upholding such deductions would frustrate a well-de-
fined public policy.1 For example, a ship-repair yard was denied 
section 162 deductions for ".kickbacks" paid to officers of foreign 
vessels, 2 and truckers were denied similar deductions for fines paid 
as a result of violating state maximum-weight laws.3 The doctrine, 
which is based on a presumption against congressional intent to en-
courage violations of declared public policy, 4 thus operates to imple-
ment substantive policies unrelated to revenue collection. While the 
doctrine has been applied primarily to section 162 deductions for ex-
penses incurred in a trade or business, 5 courts have employed it to 
disallow deductions under a number of other Internal Revenue Code 
sections as well. 6 
Although the basic concept of this judicial doctrine is not com-
plex, courts have had difficulty applying it to specific fact situations 
and thus have done so inconsistently. 7 As part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969,8 Congress amended section 162 to deny business-ex-
pense deductions for fines and similar penalties, certain bribes and 
kickbacks, and two thirds of certain antitrust damage payments.9 In 
1. See, e.g., Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924). See also Ellett & Rubinstein, 
Disallowed Deductions: 1969 Tax Reform Act Changes to Code Sec. 162, 48 TAXES 
457, at 457 n.1 (1970); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from 
Gross Income: A Conceptual Analysis, 43 IND. L.J. 406, 414 n.45 (1968); Taggart, 
Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAX L. REV. 611, 
614 n.2 (1970). 
2. Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439 
(5th Cir. 1963). 
3. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958) (involuntary 
violations); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (volun-
tary and involuntary violations). 
4. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958). 
5. Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of 
Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 12 YALB L.J. 108, at 108 n.1 (1962). 
6. See, e.g., Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) (section 165 
loss on destruction of illegal whiskey); Benjamin T. Smith, 34 T.C. 1100 (1960), 
affd. per curiam, 294 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1961) (section 165 loss or section 166 bad 
debt deduction for IRS penalty); Luther M. Richey, Jr., 33 T.C. 272 (1959) (section 
165 theft loss resulting from counterfeiting scheme); Leon Turnipseed, 27 T.C. 758 
(1957) (section 151 dependency exemption for woman illegally cohabitating with 
taxpayer). 
1. Compare Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956), with Luther 
M. Richey, Jr., 33 T.C. 272 (1959). See Raymond Mazzei, 61 T.C. 497, 506 (1974) 
(Sterrett, J., dissenting). 
8. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
9. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 710-11, amend-
131 
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1971, Congress further amended section 162 to deny deductions for 
"other illegal payments."10 While these amendments partially 
codify the judicial public policy doctrine, 11 it is not clear whether 
they preempt application of the judicial doctrine to other types of 
deductions under section 162 or to deductions under other sections 
of the Code. 
The preemption question was raised most recently in Revenue 
Ruling 74-323.12 This ruling allowed an employment agency to de-
duct advertising payments as a business expense even though the 
advertisements allegedly violated title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 196413 by indicating a sex preference that was not a bona fide 
occupational qualification. In the ruling, the IRS interpreted the 
amendments to section 162 as preempting judicial application of the 
public policy doctrine, at least with regard to deductions under that 
section. The only provision of section 162 that might have disal-
lowed the deduction at issue was section 162(c)(2), which disallows 
deductions for "illegal payments" that could subject the taxpayer to 
"a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in 
a trade or business." However, since title VII provided no such 
sanction for the violation, 14 this codified public policy provision was 
not apposite. Therefore, according to the Service, the deduction 
could not be denied. 
This Note evaluates the merits of Revenue Ruling 74-323. First, 
it asserts that, while not arbitrary, the Service's resolution of the pre-
emption issue was not mandated by the language of amended section 
162 or by the relevant legislative history. Second, it maintains that 
it is both appropriate and procedurally feasible to apply the judicial 
public policy doctrine to violations of federal civil rights laws that 
impose no fine, imprisonment, loss of license, or other criminal pen-
alty. The denial of a deduction in this situation would extend the 
public policy doctrine beyond both section 162(c)(2) and the judi-
cial doctrine as it has been developed to date. This Note concludes 
that on the basis of precedent and policy the doctrine should be so 
extended. 
Even before Revenue Ruling 74-323, the Service indicated its 
belief that the 1969 and 1971 amendments to section 162 preempted 
the public policy doctrine. A recently finalized regulation for sec-
ing INT. &Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 162. The disallowance of the deduction for antitrust 
damage payments was a reaction to the allowance of such deductions by Rev. Rul. 
64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 52. See Ellett & Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 461; Tag-
gart, supra note 1, at 616-18. 
10. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, amending INT. REV. 
CODE OF 1954, § 162(c)(2). 
11. See text at notes 23, 26 infra. 
12. 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 40. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (Supp. III, 1973). 
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970); text at notes 47-49 infra. 
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tion 162 states: "A deduction for an expense paid or incurred after 
December 30, 1969, which would otherwise be allowable under sec-
tion 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such 
deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public policy."15 This 
interpretation is not necessitated by the language of the statute, how-
ever, since the statute nowhere states that the public policy doctrine 
codified therein was meant to be exclusive. Of course, the IRS 
might have so interpreted section 162 by applying the maxim of stat-
utory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius. According 
to this maxim, the fact that Congress delineated specific situations 
in which deductions will be disallowed implies that it intended to 
exclude all other situations from the application of the judicial public 
policy doctrine. The maxim is an aid to construction, however, not 
a rule of law.16 Moreover, courts have ignored the maxim where 
an expansive construction would achieve beneficial results or would 
accord with established custom, usage, or practice.17 Thus, in light 
of the long history of judicial application of the public policy doc-
trine, it would seem that its abrogation should not be inferred in the 
absence of a clear expression of legislative intent. 
The IRS in fact based its conclusion in Revenue Ruling 74-323 
on the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.18 How-
ever, an examination of the published legislative history allows no 
such facile conclusion. The amendments to section 162 were only 
one part of a tax reform act of immense proportions.19 Al-
though the issue of the appropriate treatment for antitrust damage 
payments had been under consideration for some time and therefore 
received attention in the hearings and debates, 20 the other changes 
in section 162 received little consideration, at least in the published 
legislative history.21 Except for a very similar statement in the Sen-
15. Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-l(a) (1975). 
16. Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). 
17. See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4917, at 
421 (F. Horack ed. 1943). 
18. Rev. Rul. 74-323, 1974-2 CUM. BULL. 40, at 40. 
19. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 40690 (1969) (remarks of Senator Moss). The 
main purposes of the Act were to reduce the scope of tax preferences and to give 
some measure of relief to low-income taxpayers. See, e.g., id. at 35485 (remarks of 
Senator Long), 40865 (remarks of Representative Mills). 
20. See Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 743-44, 5224-25, 5241, 5278-87 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings]; 115 CONG. REC. 35905, 38301-04 (1969). 
21. The initial bill, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), did not include a 
provision on the public policy doctrine. The changes to section 162 therefore were 
not considered during the hearings held by the House Ways and Means Committee. 
The hearings of the Senate Finance Committee, which considered essentially the 
House version of the bill, contain references only to the treatment of antitrust dam-
ages. See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 743-44, 5224-25, 5241, 5278-87. After 
completing its hearings, the Senate Finance Committee incorporated into the major 
bill a second bill (containing essentially the present provisions) that had been intro-
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ate report, 22 the only direct reference to the intended effect of the 
amendments to section 162 is contained in a summary of the bill 
prepared by the Senate Finance Committee: "The codification of 
the rule denying deductions for payments in these situations (speci-
fied by sections 162(c), (f), and (g)) which are deemed to violate 
public policy is designed to be all-inclusive. Thus, public policy gen-
erally will not be deemed to be sufficiently clearly defined in other 
circumstances to justify disallowance of deductions."23 While the 
phrase "all-inclusive" in the first sentence can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of congressional intent to abrogate the judicial doctrine 
in all other situations, the use of the word "generally'' in the second 
sentence implies the opposite. If Congress had intended to foreclose 
application of the judicial doctrine completely, it could have asserted 
that it was deeming that public policy is not "sufficiently clearly de-
fined" in any other circumstances. The second sentence thus sug-
gests that courts can deny deductions on public policy grounds in 
other areas where public policy is "sufficiently clearly defined." 
Given this apparent contradiction and the dearth of other evidence 
of legislative intent, the conclusion of the Service does not seem 
mandated. 24 
The Service could conceivably have buttressed its position by re-
ferring to the legislative history accompanying the 1971 amendments 
to section 162(c), which were enacted because Congress felt that 
the 1969 provisions might "unduly restrict the denial of deductions" 
in some cases. 25 The Senate report states: "The committee con-
duced on the floor and sent to the committee. See S. 2631, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969). The Senate committee report on the changes to section 162 addressed itself 
mainly to the antitrust damage payment provision, see S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 273-75 (1969), and Senate floor debate on the changes related only 
to the antitrust provision. See 115 CONG. REc. 35905, 38301-04 (1969). The bill 
presented to the Senate for debate covered 585 pages and was accompanied by a 352-
page report. See 115 CoNG. REc. 37634 (1969). The Senate added 376 substantive 
amendments to the House bill in the committee and on the floor, 308 of which-
including the changes to section 162-were embodied in the conference report. See 
115 CONG. REC. 40698 (1969). This conference version of the bill was passed with 
haste by both houses. Three hours after the House received the conference report 
it began a two-hour debate, with no amendments allowed from the floor. Several 
members of the House protested; typical are the remarks of Representative Pickle: 
"I repeat-this is crash legislation and we were faced with the alternative of accept-
ing or rejecting major legislation almost completely on blind faith and newspaper ac-
counts." 115 CONG. REc. 40896 (1969). 
22. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 21, at 274. 
23. Summary of H.R. 13270 As Reported by the Comm. on Finance, in Se11ate 
Heari11gs, supra note 20, at 6629, 6743. 
24. One is reminded of the remark of Justice Frankfurter: "Spurious use of legis-
lative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that 
only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute." Frankfurter, Some 
Reflectio,rs on the Readi11g of Statutes, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 521, 543 (1947). 
25. S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1971). 
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tinues to believe that the determination of when a deduction should 
be denied should remain under the control of Congress. However, 
the committee has concluded that the area in which deductions are 
denied should be expanded somewhat beyond the limits set in 
1969."26 Arguably, the language of this committee report and the 
subsequent enactment of the 1971 amendments are evidence of a 
congressional belief that the 1969 amendments preempted applica-
tion of the judicial doctrine. Alternatively, however, the language 
can be read merely as a congressional attempt to ensure that courts 
would not allow deductions in the specific situations, delineated in 
section 162; in which Congress wanted all deductions disallowed. 
On this reading, courts would remain free to expand the public pol-
icy doctrine. Moreover, the importance of the language is unclear 
since it is in effect an interpretation by one congress of legislation 
enacted by a previous congress: To allow a later congress to inter-
pret definitively the work of a former congress is tantamount to ac-
cording a function of the judiciary to the legislature or a legislative 
committee. 27 
Three members of the Tax Court recently concluded that the 
legislative history of the 1969 and 1971 amendments does not evi-
dence congressional intent to preempt the judicial public policy doc-
trine. The taxpayer in Raymond Mazzei28 claimed a section 162 
deduction for $20,000 that he lost as the victim of an alleged plan 
or conspiracy to produce counterfeit currency. The court disallowed 
the deduction on public policy grounds. The 1969 amendments 
were inapplicable since the taxpayer claimed a section 165 deduction 
rather than a section 162 deduction and since the loss occurred in 
taxable year 1965. 29 Eight of the judges, however, offered interpre-
tations of the amendments. In a concurring opinion, three of the 
judges stated: 
[I]n enacting the amendments to section 162, dealing with the de-
duction of various iten;is involving such considerations, Congress left 
the door open by recognizing that "public policy, in other circum-
stances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the dis-
allowance of deductions." See S. Rept. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., p. 274 (1969) (emphasis added). The reference to legislative 
retention of control over deductions in the Senate committee report 
accompanying the Revenue Act of 1971 was limited to situations in-
26. Id. 
27. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
28. 61 T.C. 497 (1974). 
29. Although some of the 1969 and 1971 amendments apply retroactively, the 
amendments disallowing deductions for "other illegal payments" were not given such 
effect. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(c), 83 Stat. 711, 
amending INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 162; Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-
178, § 310(b), 85 Stat. 525, amending INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162. 
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volving bribes and kickbacks. See S. Rept. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess., p. 72 (1971).30 
In a dissenting opinion, five of the judges read the 1969 and 1971 
amendments as merely calling for "judicial restraint" in applying the 
doctrine outside of section 162.31 
Thus, it is fair to state that neither statutory interpretation nor 
legislative history compels the conclusion that the partial codification 
of the public policy doctrine in section 162 preempted the judicial 
doctrine under that section. Four interpretations of the intended ef-
fect of the amendments can be postulated. An analysis of these in-
terpretations supports the proposition that the amendments did not 
abrogate the judicial doctrine under section 162. 
The first interpretation of the amendments is that Congress in-
tended the public policy doctrine to exist only to the extent that it 
has been codified. Thus, because the doctrine is presently codified 
exclusively in section 162, the doctrine may no longer be applied 
to deductions claimed under any other Code provision. This inter-
pretation could be derived from a literal reading of the language of 
the 1971 Senate report, which states "that the determination of when 
a deduction should be denied should remain under the control of 
Congress."32 It is clear, however, that neither the Service nor the 
courts has so construed the amendments: A recently issued regula-
tion under section 212 would incorporate into that section the public 
policy doctrine codified in section 162, 33 and since the 1969 amend-
ments were enacted, several courts have applied the judicial public 
policy doctrine to deductions claimed under sections other than 
162.34 Furthermore, while this first interpretation has the advan-
tage of easy application, it would create an anomaly between section 
162 and other Code sections. Under section 162(c)(2), a factory 
owner who bribed a building inspector in violation of a "generally 
enforced" local or state law could not deduct the bribe as an 
"ordinary and necessary'' business expense. Following this first in-
terpretation, however, a landlord could deduct a similar bribe under 
section 212 as an "ordinary and necessary" expense incurred in the 
30. 61 T.C. at 504 (Tannenwald, J., joined by Dawson and Raum, JJ., concur-
ring). 
31. 61 T.C. at 506 (Sterrett, J., joined by Forrester, Featherston, Hall, and Wiles, 
JJ., dissenting). 
32. S. REP. No. 92-437, supra note 25, at 72. 
33. Treas. Reg. 1.212-l(p) (1975). In addition, the Department of the Treasury 
has incorporated the public policy doctrine into section 213 medical expense deduc-
tions by disallowing deductions for amounts expended for illegal operations or treat-
ments, Treas. Reg. 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957), and for medicine and drugs not legally 
procured. Treas. Reg. 1.213-l(e)(2) (1957). 
34. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 460 (D.D.C. 1972) (alterna-
tive holding); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd. mem. sub nom. 
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Raymond Mazzei, 61 T.C. 497 (1974). 
November 1975] Public Policy Doctrine 137 
production of income. Given the general parallelism of the two 
Code sections, it is doubtful that Congress intended this result. 
The second interpretation is that the amendments had no 
effect on the application of the judicial doctrine to Code sections 
other than 162. Thus, business-expense deductions could only be 
disallowed in those situations specified by Congress, while other de-
ductions could be disallowed by the courts in cases where they deem 
application of the doctrine appropriate. This interpretation, how-
ever, might also create anomalous results. For example, an employ-
ment agency that advertised in violation of title VII would be al-
lowed a section 162 deduction for the costs of so advertising. How-
ever, a landlord who similarly advertised might be denied a section 
212 deduction on the basis of the judicial public policy doctrine. 
The third interpretation is that the judicial doctrine has been pre-
empted, but the public policy doctrine as codified in section 162 
should be applied to other Code sections. Thus, the courts could 
deny deductions only for those types of expenditures specified by 
Congress in section 162. This approach, which apparently has been 
adopted by the IRS with respect to section 212, has the advantage 
of eliminating the inter-section disparities the other alternatives may 
produce. However, there are two problems with this interpretation. 
First, although sections 162 and 212 are similar enough that the lit-
eral language of section 162 could be applied to section 212, that 
language could not be applied without alteration to other Code sec-
tions allowing deductions. For example, section 162 disallows a de-
duction for "illegal payments." A bad debt incurred as a result of 
lending money for an illegal purpose is not, literally, an illegal pay-
ment. Yet, such a bad debt seems to come within 1:he spirit of the 
public policy doctrine as codified in section 162. To apply the codi-
fied doctrine outside section 162, the Service and the courts would 
be forced to extract from section 162 certain "principles" to be 
carried over into other sections and would be exercising discretion 
in doing so. Thus, the whole purpose of abrogating the judicial doc-
trine might be defeated. Second, even if the 1969 and 1971 amend-
ments are interpreted merely to provide guidance for courts imple-
menting the doctrine under other Code sections and are not viewed 
as literally binding outside section 162 (the interpretation adopted 
by t}le dissent in Mazzei),35 there is little logical support for this posi-
tion. Had Congress wanted to amend other sections in addition to 
162, it presumably would have done so. Indeed, the fact that Con-
gress amended only section 162 suggests that Congress did not un-
dertake to enact a comprehensive public policy doctrine that would 
preempt the judicial doctrine. 
35. 61 T.C. at 506. 
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The final interpretation of the amendments to section 162 is that 
courts remain free to apply the doctrine to deductions under all sec-
tions of the Code, including section 162. Under this interpretation, 
courts may disallow deductions in all cases in which they determine 
that application of the doctrine is appropriate and must disallow de-
ductions in those situations set forth by Congress in section 162. Like 
the third interpretation, this interpretation would avoid the problem 
of treating inconsistently deductions arising under similar Code sec-
tions. Above all, this interpretation allows courts to implement pub-
lic policy as it becomes more clearly defined. To be sure, inconsist-
encies may arise when courts disagree about whether public policy 
is sufficiently clear to warrant invocation of the doctrine. But there 
is little reason why Supreme Court decisions outlining the proper 
method for implementing the doctrine cannot minimize the disrup-
tive impact of such inconsistencies. In light of the long history of 
application of the public policy doctrine by the judiciary and the ap-
parent lack of consideration by Congress regarding the effect of the 
amendments, the fourth alternative interpretation-that the courts 
may still apply the judicial doctrine to deductions under all sections 
of the Code-seems most reasonable. 
Having concluded that a court may apply the judicial public pol-
icy doctrine to section 162 deductions, this Note will next examine 
the considerations that should underlie a decision to do so in cases 
where anti-discrimination legislation has been violated. While Rev-
enue Ruling 74-323 involved allegations of sex discrimination only, 
the same considerations apply to other forms of illegal discrimination 
as well. 
The first consideration is whether public policy is sufficiently 
well-defined in this context that judges would be implementing ac-
cepted public standards rather than private conceptions of morality. 
The difficulty in making this determination in many areas has been 
the basis of criticisms of the doctrine. 36 Federal policy in the area 
of discrimination, however, is well-established and universally recog-
nized. 37 In addition, since anti-discrimination is a federal policy, ap-
plication of the doctrine would not lead to a nonuniform tax assess-
ment for similarly situated individuals residing in different states, as 
might an application of the doctrine to state policy.38 Thus, any 
36. See, e.g., Ellett & Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 461. 
37. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1880). 
38. See generally Ellett & Rubinstein, supra note 1, at 458; Gordon, supra note 
I, at 412-14; Note, supra note 5, at 141-44. This problem of federalism is particu-
larly acute when disallowance of a federal income tax deduction for expenses violat• 
ing a state law results in an economic loss to the taxpayer that is completely out 
of proportion to any sanction imposed by the state whose law has been violated. For 
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criticism must be directed at practical problems (discussed below)89 
in determining when the policy has been violated. 
The second consideration is whether the tax laws should be em-
ployed to further public policies unrelated to revenue collection 
when other means of achieving the desired ends are viable. 40 While 
the construction of a neutral tax system has been viewed as one goal 
of the tax laws, this goal has remained secondary: Congress, the 
IRS, and the courts have often used tax laws to implement various 
substantive policies. 41 Those who argue for neutrality in this context 
assert that the federal tax scheme imposes a tax on net income, not 
gross income.42 Deductions are not matters of legislative grace, but 
rather are necessary considerations in determining net income. 43 
Thus, they argue, taxpayers should be able to deduct all expendi-
tures regardless of the policy considerations implicated. Yet, the tax 
laws are only a small portion of all state and federal laws. Tax laws 
purporting to operate neutrally may actually conflict with nontax 
laws. Indeed, as originally formulated the purpose of the public pol-
icy doctrine was not to implement substantive, nonrevenue policies, 
but to alter the tax system so as to avoid frustrating the operation 
of other laws. 44 In the area of advertising expenditures in violation 
of title VII, for example, it is not clear whether the principle of 
neutrality is furthered by allowing deductions for such expenditures 
and thereby sanctioning violations of title VII, or by disallowing de-
ductions and thereby encouraging compliance with the law. Indeed, 
a neutrality argument could be used to justify an expanded public 
policy doctrine that tempers the tax laws to avoid conflict with other 
laws. 
Section 162 allows deductions for "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses. It is difficult to contend, however, that an expendi-
example, in Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43 (1955), an insurance agent paid 
$75,000 in referral commissions in violation of Illinois law. The state insurance 
commission merely issued a reprimand and conditioned the agent's license on future 
compliance with the law since the law in general was not adequately enforced. The 
tax court denied the taxpayer a federal income tax deduction for the $75,000. 
39. See text at notes 60-62 infra. 
40. See generally Gordon, supra note 1, at 411. 
41. See McGiotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v. Con-
nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd. mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 
997 (1971). 
42. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 114. 
43. The legislative grace theory has been subject to much criticism. See, e.g., 
Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Narrowly 
Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1943); Note, 
supra note 5, at 114. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Commissioner v. Tellier, 
383 U.S. 687 (1966), also seems to discount the theory: "We start with the proposi-
tion that the federal income tax is a tax on net income ..•• " 383 U.S. at 691. 
44. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966); Tank Truclc Rentals, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958). 
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tu.re, the payment of which violates federal law, is either ordinary 
or necessary to the operation of a business. The inconsistency of 
the laws in such a case is clear: The Civil Rights Act denominates 
an activity illegal while the tax law views the costs of that activity 
as ordinary and necessary to the operation of a business. The con-
clusion that this inconsistency was intended by Congress should not 
be assumed absent the clearest evidence. In short, allowing taxpay-
ers to deduct all expenditures in computing net income in no sense 
purifies or neutralizes the tax laws. Such an approach may offer 
conceptual simplicity, yet it is fraught with policy overtones. 
The third consideration underlying the application of the public 
policy doctrine to expenditures resulting from illegal, discriminatory 
acts is that the disallowance of deductions for such expenditures im-
poses an economic sanction that often has no relation to the severity 
of the offense. Thus, the impact of the disallowance of a deduction 
depends upon the amount of the expenditures and the tax bracket 
of the taxpayer rather than on the amount of harm caused and the · 
taxpayer's mens rea. In this context, there may be a reasonable cor-
relation between the sanctions and the harm since the amount ex-
pended on advertising is roughly related to the number of people 
the advertising reaches.45 Yet even when no correlation exists, this 
criticism of applying the doctrine has little force. The aim of the 
doctrine is not to penalize illegal expenditures, but rather to coor-
dinate the tax laws to avoid sanctioning violations of substantive pol-
icy laws. The disallowance of a deduction is thus a recognition by 
the tax law of the illegitimacy of a certain expenditure. While the 
tax laws generally tax net income rather than gross income, 46 adher-
ence to this general policy is not a shibboleth of validity for a partic-
ular tax provision. The disallowance of business expenditures not 
ordinary and necessary, for example, is a clear and intentional devia-
tion from that general policy. In short, there are no conceptual ob-
stacles to disallowing deductions and deviating slightly from the pol-
icy of taxing net rather than gross income. 
The final consideration is whether existing remedies for a partic-
ular act of unlawful discrimination render unnecessary an expansion 
of the public policy doctrine. While no blanket response to this is-
sue is possible, the remedies that Revenue Ruling 74-323 pointed 
to as available for the violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-
injunctive relief against future violations and restoration of lost 
pay47-do not make expansion of the doctrine unnecessary. The 
45. Indeed, the disallowance of a deduction may bear a more rational relation 
to the harm than would a set fine. 
46. See, e.g., 50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams). 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII 
Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 824 (1972). 
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injunctive relief possible is prospective in nature and therefore does 
little to deter. Lost pay is available only upon a showing that, but 
for the unlawful advertisement, the plaintiff would have sought and 
obtained the employment. 48 This second remedy often poses insur-
mountable problems of proof for a complaining party. Furthermore, 
relief is limited to back pay and is reduced by the amount of the 
plaintiffs earnings during the period prior to the judicial award.49 
It therefore seems appropriate to apply the public policy doctrine 
as a further deterrent against unlawful discrimination. 
Two fairly recent cases provide support for extending the judicial 
doctrine to section 162 deductions for expenses incurred as a result 
of engaging in discriminatory practices. In Green v. Connally,50 the 
plaintiffs, parents of black school children attending public schools 
in Mississippi, sought to enjoin United States Treasury officials both 
from according tax-exempt status under ,section 501(c)(3) to pri-
vate schools in that state discriminatjng against black students and 
from allowing deductions under section 170(c)(2) for contributions 
to such schools. The three-judge district court, relying on "the gen-
eral and well-established principle that the Congressional intent in 
providing tax deductions and exemptions is not construed to be ap-
plicable to activities that are either illegal or contrary to public pol-
icy,''51 held that such exemptions and deductions could not be coun-
tenanced. As the court stated, "The Code must be construed and 
applied in consonance with the Federal public policy against support 
for racial segregation of schools, public or private."52 
In McGlotten v. Connally,53 the plaintiffs, Blacks allegedly de-
nied membership in a fraternal order because of their race, brought 
a class action "to enjoin the Secretary of Treasury from granting tax 
benefits to fraternal and nonprofit organizations which exclude non-
whites from membership."54 Plaintiffs challenged sections 501(c) 
(7) and (8) to the extent that those sections authorized the exemp-
tion from income taxation of nonprofit clubs and fraternal orders ex-
cluding nonwhites from membership, and they challenged section 
170(c)(4) to the extent that it permitted deductions for individual 
contributions to such organizations. Although the three-judge dis-
trict court focused primarily on the constitutionality of these sections, 
48. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). 
49. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1259 (1971). 
50. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd. mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 
997 (1971). Because the IRS changed its position in the course of the suit, the Su-
preme Court's affirmance "lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a truly 
adversary controversy." Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 (1974). 
51. 330 F. Supp. at 1161. 
52. 330 F. Supp. at 1163. 
53. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
54. 338 F. Supp. at 450 (footnotes omitted). 
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it also stated: "[11here is a clearly indicated Congressional policy 
that the beneficiaries of federal largesse should not discriminate. 
We think this overriding public policy, even in the absence of our 
constitutional holding [in favor of the plaintiffs], requires that the 
Code not be construed to allow the deduction of contributions to or-
ganizations which exclude nonwhites from membership."66 
Green and McGlotten can be viewed as extensions of the judicial 
public policy doctrine. Both cases were decided after the 1969 
amendments to section 162 and both denied tax benefits to organiza-
tions engaging in discriminatory practices notwithstanding the ab-
sence of specific disallowance provisions in the Code. Moreover, 
the alleged discriminatory acts in both instances were not punishable 
by criminal penalties or fines. Although both cases involved racial 
discrimination, which more clearly invokes constitutional overtonesu0 
than does sex discrimination, their precedential value should not be 
limited to racial discrimination only. Sex discrimination is also 
clearly proscribed by federal laws and also merits the support of the 
public policy doctrine. 
Arguably, Green and McGlotten can be distinguished from cases 
such as that posed in Revenue Ruling 74-323 on the ground that 
business-expense deductions under section 162 do not constitute 
government subsidies as do the provisions on charitable deductions 
and tax-exempt status. Thus, while business-expense deductions 
implement the federal policy of taxing net income, deductions under 
section 170 and tax exemptions under section 501 are deliberate de-
partures from this policy. Such a distinction was suggested by the 
McGlotten court when it stated that, unlike the benefits there in is-
sue, deductions such as those for business expenses "do not act as 
matching grants, but are merely attempts to provide for an equitable 
measure of net income."57 Similarly, it can be argued that since sec-
tions 170 and 501 are based upon policy considerations not relevant 
to revenue collection, 58 it is more appropriate to deny their applica-
tion because of conflicting nonrevenue policies-in this case the pol-
icy against discrimination-than it is to deny the application of sec-
tion 162.59 These distinctions, however, are not persuasive. It is 
55. 338 F. Supp. at 460. 
56. The McGlotten court held that the granting of tax-exempt status and the al-
lowance of charitable deductions for contributions constituted government support of 
discrimination in violation of the fifth amendment. 338 F. Supp. at 456-51. The 
court in Green specifically based its holding on public policy grounds to avoid the 
constitutional question. 330 F. Supp. at 1164-65. 
57. 338 F. Supp. at 457 (footnote omitted). For an argument against such a dis-
tinction, see Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the 
Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 68-74 (1972). 
58. See H. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938); McGlotten v. Con-
nally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972). 
59. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C.), affd. mem. sub 
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (''The public policy limitation on tax ben-
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not necessary that deductions be considered grants of governmental 
largess to disallow them on public policy grounds. Nor is it neces-
sary to dispute that the federal tax scheme essentially taxes net in-
come. The issue in each instance is whether the allowance of a tax 
benefit conflicts with other laws and, with regard to this issue, Green 
and McGlotten are relevant. Both cases indicate that the federal 
policy against discrimination is sufficiently clear to require alteration 
of the tax scheme to avoid frustrating this policy. Both suggest, 
therefore, that expenditures stemming from discriminatory advertis-
ing should not be considered "ordinary and necessary" under sec-
tions 162 and 212 because they violate a well-defined public policy. 
One problem with expanding the public policy doctrine in the 
manner suggested here is that the uniform application of the doctrine 
to all appropriate situations could turn the IRS into a law enforce-
ment agency. 6° Clearly, it would be both infeasible and undesirable 
to require the IRS to determine the legality of advertising and similar 
activities. A reasonable alternative is to require individuals who de-
sire to challenge the legality of various expenditures to complain first 
to either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a sim-
ilar administrative body charged in the first instance with adjudicat-
ing allegations of discrimination. These administrative bodies could, 
without undue burden, report their determination to the IRS, and 
the IRS could then disallow deductions claimed for unlawful ex-
penditures. Because, as noted below, 61 standing to sue in federal 
court presumably would be restricted to those individuals who have 
a reasonable claim for damages or injunctive relief, these more 
specialized tribunals would be resorted to initially in most instances. 
Individuals who lacked standing to bring claims in the specialized 
tribunals normally would also lack standing to challenge tax deduc-
tions in federal courts. This alternative would, for example, be con-
siderably less burdensome on the IRS than the affirmative duty, im-
posed by the court in Green, to investigate the activities of private 
schools in Mississippi before granting them tax-exempt status. 62 
Because they arguably prevent third parties from contesting de-
ductions allowed to alleged wrongdoers, the Anti-Injunction Stat-
ute, 63 the Declaratory Judgment Act,64 and the requirement of ap-
efits applies a fortiori to the case before us, involving the charitable deduction whose 
very purpose is rooted in helping institutions because they serve the public good"). 
60. See Taggart, supra note 1, at 615. See also Note, supra note 5, at 129. 
61. See text at notes 70-83 infra. 
62. 330 F. Supp. at 1176. 
63. INT. RBv. CoDB OF 1954, § 7421(a). This provision states: "Except as pro-
vided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b)(l), no suit for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained 
in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom 
such tax was assessed." 
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). The Declaratory Judgment Act provides: "In a 
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propriate standing to sue65 may also make it difficult to apply the 
public policy doctrine to discrimination cases. When the govern-
ment disallows a deduction on public policy grounds, the taxpayer 
can obtain judicial review either by paying the assessed amount and 
instituting a refund suit or by refusing to pay and thus forcing the 
Service to sue for a deficiency.66 When the Government allows the 
claimed deduction, however, judicial review is obtainable only 
through a third-party suit for mjunctive or declaratory relief. 
Although the Anti-Injunction Statute, which prohibits all actions 
"for the purpose of restraining the assessment of any tax," and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, which specifically excepts cases involving 
federal taxes from its scope, may be interpreted as barring third-
party actions aimed at preventing the allowance of tax benefits, sev-
eral recent decisions have rejected such an interpretation. 67 These 
decisions concluded that the Anti-Injunction Statute did not prevent 
third-party challenges since the effect of such suits was not to restrain 
the government from collecting taxes but rather to compel the collec-
tion of more taxes. 68 Moreover, as several of the decisions noted, 
the Declaratory Judgment Act does not bar such actions since, in 
the tax context, that Act is coterminous with the Anti-Injunction Stat-
ute. 69 Thus, these statutory obstacles do not appear to interfere with 
extension of the public policy doctrine to discrimination cases. 
More troublesome is the requirement that a third party must 
have proper standing in order to maintain a cause of action. The 
recognized standard for determining standing is two-fold: the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that she has suffered "injury in fact" and that 
she is within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected or regu-
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, 
any court of the United States, . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations 
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or 
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judg-
ment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." (Emphasis added.) 
65. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1282 n.6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. May 19, 1975). 
66. JNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6212-13, 7422; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a){1) (1970), 
1491 (Supp. m, 1973). 
61. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. May 19, 1975); Tax Analysts & Advo-
cates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. 
Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). The grant of standing in Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Or-
ganization was criticized in Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 57, at 53-60. 
68. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1284 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. May 19, 1975); Tax Analysts & 
Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C. 1974); McGlotten v. Connally, 
338 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C. 1972). 
69. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. May 19, 1975). See Tax Analysts & 
Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D.D.C. 1974); McGlotten v. Con-
nally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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lated by the statute in question. 70 
It is clear that the requisite "injury in fact" need not be signifi-
cant or direct: it must be a "distinct and palpable injury" to the 
plaintiff, but can be "shared by a large class of other possible 
litigants."71 In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),72 the Supreme Court held that the 
impairment of economic, recreational, and aesthetic opportunities, 
which would result from an increased use of nonrecyclable goods, 
was sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff organization. In 
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz,73 the plaintiff organization chal-
lenged an IRS ruling that allowed certain contributions to political 
campaigns to escape the gift tax. The court found the requisite 
injury in the allegation of one of the organization's officers that 
"his ability to affect the electoral process and to persuade elected 
officials to adopt policies and programs he favors"74 would be 
substantially diminished.75 Finally, in Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Organization v. Shultz,76 the plaintiffs, "comprising various 
health and welfare organizations and several private citizens, all al-
leging indigency and an inability to pay for hospital services,"77 were 
conferred standing to challenge an IRS ruling that eliminated the re-
quirement that hospitals must provide free or reduced-rate services 
to indigents in order to qualify as "charitable" institutions. The 
court had little difficulty in finding the requisite "injury in fact": 
Prior to that Ruling the policy of the Service, in a very real sense, 
conferred a cognizable interest to indigents by requiring hospitals 
seeking tax advantages under the Code to give them special consid-
eration. It simply defies common sense to contend '1:hat the· plaintiffs 
have remained, or will remain, unaffected by a decision which. all but 
strips from them basic and substantial benefits which had been pre-
viously nurtured by the government. 78 
In a situation like that posited in Revenue Ruling .74-323, indi-
viduals seeking employment could allege that the discriminatory ad-
vertising caused them to forgo applying for jobs for which they were 
70. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
53 (1970); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 329-33 
(D.D.C. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. 
v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. 
May 19, 1975). 
71. Warth v. Seldin, 43 U.S.L.W. 4906, 4909 (U.S. June 25, 1975). 
72. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
73. 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974). 
74. 376 F, Supp. at 898. 
75. 376 F. Supp. at 899. 
76. 370 F. Supp. 32S (D.D.C. 1973), revd. on other ground sub- nom. Eastern 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, S06 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 
43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. May 19, 197S). 
77. 370 F. Supp. at 326. 
78. 370 F. Supp. at 329-30. 
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legally qualified. A public policy doctrine that disallowed deduc-
tions for discriminatory advertising expenditures would constitute 
part of the remedy for such illegal advertising by sanctioning individ-
ual instances and deterring future violations. A tax ruling allowing 
a deduction would therefore further injure those affected by discrim-
inatory advertisements by denying them full relief, by in effect legiti-
mating the advertisements, and by perhaps encouraging future viola-
tions. This injury is considerably more individualized and specific 
than the general injury suffered by all taxpayers from the decreased 
tax revenues that result from the allowance of tax deductions.70 In 
light of the above precedent, this injury should satisfy the first prong 
of the standing test. It is clear, however, that plaintiffs cannot assert 
standing unless they themselves have been sufficiently injured. 80 
This limitation may restrict standing to those individuals who can 
demonstrate a likelihood that they would have obtained employment 
except for the discriminatory advertisements. 
The case law surrounding the second prong of the standing re-
quirement-that the plaintiffs injury must fall within the "zone of 
interests" regulated or protected by the statute at issue-is somewhat 
confused. Some cases have held that the second standard adds little 
to the first-that the two requirements are virtually coterminous. 81 
The viability of this second requirement was recently asserted, how-
ever, in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon.82 In that case, the 
court denied standing to plaintiff taxpayers who sought review of the 
Code provisions and regulations that allowed income tax credits for 
payments made to foreign countries in connection with oil extraction 
and production. The inquiry under the second prong, the court 
concluded, was whether the tax provisions and rulings in question 
affected the plaintiff taxpayers differently from every other federal 
taxpayer. 83 Thus, only those tax provisions that recognize and pro-
tect an identifiable interest of specific individuals could be chal-
lenged by third parties. 
This interpretation of the second prong of the standing require-
ment is restrictive since it precludes third-party challenges to many 
tax provisions, regulations, and rulings. Yet even this restrictive in-
terpretation would not deny standing to individuals injured by dis-
criminatory advertisements. A public policy doctrine that disal-
lowed deductions for the cost of such advertisements would recog-
nize and protect the interests of those individuals against ·whom the 
79. Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
80. See Warth v. Seldin, 43 U.S.LW. 4906, 4908-09 (U.S. June 25, 1975). 
81. See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 897 
(D.D.C. 1974) (citing cases). 
82. 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 512 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
83. See 390 F. Supp. at 940. 
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advertisements unlawfully discriminated. Such individuals would be 
affected by a tax ruling allowing a deduction in a manner distinguish-
able from the effect on other taxpayers generally. This identifiable 
interest should satisfy the second prong of the standing requirement. 
Finally, policy considerations also support the grant of standing 
in this situation: If third parties injured by the allowance of a deduc-
tion were not permitted to challenge it, the decision would never 
be subject to judicial review.84 Although the government clearly has 
an interest in maintaining a tax structure free from potentially dis-
ruptive challenges by those only indirectly affected by a particular 
ruling, it has little interest in precluding individuals directly injured 
from challenging rulings under tax laws that recognize and protect 
specific citizen interests. 
84. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 333 
(D.D.C. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. 
v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3613 (U.S. 
May 19, 1975). 
